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Abstract 
The traditional belief that marriage provides a husband 
with sole rights over his wife, thereby exempting him 
from any prosecution for raping his wife, has been the 
justification for denying a woman the right to consent to 
sexual intercourse in marriage. Unfortunately, this belief 
has been a source of subjugation and exploitation of 
women at the behest of their husbands. Despite 
recommendations to revoke it, the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 2013 has retained the marital 
exception. The purpose of this article is to examine this 
dichotomy in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 
that punishes rape as such, but does not penalise a 
husband raping his wife of fifteen years or above. 
Employing doctrinal method of research, this article 
analyses the various discrepancies and ambiguities in the 
Act of 2013 that perpetuate this culture of oppression and 
violence. Consent is the antithesis to rape. Thus, having 
examined the need for a married woman‟s right to 
consent, this note examines the ensuing lacunae that grant 
legal sanction to child marriages, create an unexplained 
discrepancy in the punishment for rape, and create 
variations in the age of consent and the age for availing 
exception. The recognition of marital rape when spouses 
live separately and not otherwise appears to be a 
mysterious distinction. Further, treatment of marital rape  
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as a civil wrong rather than as a crime is a reflection of the patriarchal 
notion that still treats a woman as her husband‟s property. It is argued 
that marriage establishes a relation of trust, the infringement of which 
demands greater accountability and punishment. This article analyzes 
these provisions, which evidence the patriarchal frame of mind that 
silences women‟s voices in the conjugal domain. 
 
Keywords:  Age of Consent, Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, 
Marital Rape, Right to Consent, Verma Committee Report 2013. 
Introduction 
“The husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself 
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and 
contract the wife hath given herself up in this kind unto her 
husband which she cannot retract.”                                                                      
-Sir Matthew Hale1 
The traditional belief that marriage provides a husband with the 
„license to rape‟, thereby exempting him from any prosecution for 
raping his wife is evidenced by the above quote. Outlawing this 
traditional notion, Justice Brennan of Australian High Court, 
observed in 1991 that “[t]he common law fiction has always been 
offensive to human dignity and incompatible with the legal status 
of a spouse”.2 Surprisingly, India has refrained from outlawing 
marital rape even though it is the most common and repugnant 
form of masochism in Indian society, which remains hidden behind 
the veil of marriage.3 Research indicates that marital rape has 
severe and long lasting consequences for women, both physical 
                                                          
1  SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN  629 (1736);  
See,  S. FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 55-57 (1997). 
2  R v. L [1991] H.C.A. 48; (1991) 174 C.L.R. 379, 40, 2. 
3 See generally, K.N.CHANDRASHEKHARAN PILLAI, WOMEN AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, ENGENDERING LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LOTIKA SARKAR 
(Amita Dhanda & Archana Parashar Eds., 1999); DWARKA NATH MITTER, 
THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN HINDU LAW  (1913); A.S. ALTEKAR, THE 
POSITION OF WOMEN IN HINDU CIVILIZATION (2nd ed. 1959). 
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and psychological.4 Physical effects include injuries to private 
organs, miscarriages, stillbirths, bladder infections, infertility and 
the potential contraction of sexually transmitted diseases like 
HIV/AIDS. Women raped by their partners also suffer severe 
psychological consequences such as flashbacks, sexual dysfunction, 
and emotional pain, for years after violence.5 
As per the report by the National Crime Records Bureau, „Crime in 
India 2012,‟6 offenders were known to the rape victims in as many 
as 24,470 (98.2%) cases and about 1.6% of these cases involved 
parents and close family members. This minor percentage is also a 
reflection of the fact that marital rape is not regarded as a crime per 
se, and hence is sparingly reported.  Despite the recommendations 
of Justice Verma Committee (JVC Report)7 to criminalize marital 
rape, the  exception to section 375 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), 
which grants an exemption to sexual intercourse by husband with 
his wife of above fifteen years of age, is retained. This legislative 
note analyses the patriarchal and chauvinistic notion that is 
evidenced in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013.8 
Women’s Right to Consent: The Dilemma 
“The being of a woman is suspended during the marriage, or at 
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband, 
under whose wing, protection and cover she performs everything.”  
                                                          
4 R. THORNHILL & C. T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE-BIOLOGICAL 
BASES OR SEXUAL COERCION (1 ed., 2000); R. THORNHILL & N. THORNHILL, 
THE EVOLUION OF PSCHOLOGICAL PAIN, IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(R. Bell N. Bell eds., 1989). 
5 Id. 
6 MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, NATIONAL CRIME RECORDS BUREAU, Crime in 
India 2012, Chapter 5, available at http://ncrb.gov.in/ (last visited Mar. 10, 
2014). 
7 JUSTICE VERMA COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL LAW, Report of 
the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (January 23, 2013). 
8 The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013. 
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- Justice Blackstone9 
The hesitation in recognizing marital rape is premised on the 
chauvinistic understanding that a woman is the property of her 
husband10 and rape laws have, in essence, existed to safeguard the 
masculine pride in the exclusive possession of a sexual object.11 
This section reflects on the arguments that favour or abhor this 
sinister belief that a married woman is bereft of any right to 
consent.  
Is Woman’s Consent Material? 
The JVC Report noted that exemption of marital rape reduces 
women to „no more than the property of their husbands'.12 This is 
the patriarchal notion that has fuelled this injustice. A woman, 
however, cannot be relegated to the status of a chattel13, and has an 
identity different from that of her husband. Further, a married 
woman has the same right to exercise control over her body as an 
unmarried woman.14 The other contention that the State does not 
want to interfere in the domain of the marital home does not hold 
good because the right to privacy protects only consensual acts and 
not violent sexual assaults. Similarly, it is not difficult to 
understand that the marriage becomes irredeemable when 
intercourse is accomplished by violent assault or coercion.  
Another rationale that is advanced is that marital rape would be 
difficult to prove in the court and vindictive wives may falsely 
implicate their husbands. It is submitted that despite the existence 
of section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), proving 
                                                          
9 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON ENGLISH LAW 442 (PUB, 1844); See, supra 
note 1. 
10 Charlotte L. Mitra, For She Has No Right To Give Consent, 1979 Cr. L. J 
558. 
11 JULIA R. & HERMAN SCHEWENDINGER, RAPE AND INEQUALITY 95 (PUB. 
1993). 
12 Supra note 7 at 112. 
13 L.H.V Prasad v. Station House Officer, Alwal Police Station, 1999 Cr.L.J. 
3928 (A.P.). 
14  People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2nd 152, 485 N.Y.S. 2nd 207 (1984). 
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lack of consent is the most difficult part in any rape prosecution. If 
this be the logic, then virtually all crimes other than homicide 
should go unpunished for failure to provide overwhelmingly 
believable evidence.15 The final argument put forward by male 
chauvinists is that marital rape is not as serious an offence as other 
rape and is thus adequately dealt with in legislations such as the 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is submitted that a crime should be 
punished under penal laws and not compensated for under civil 
laws.  
The observations of the apex court in Vishakha v. State of Rajasthan16 
and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra,17 state that the 
right to be protected from sexual harassment and sexual assault is 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and is one of the pillars on which 
the very construct of gender justice stands. Thus, a woman‟s right 
to exercise autonomy over her body is in consonance with the right 
to live with dignity and equality, a value cherished in our 
Constitution and in international instruments.18 
The statutory definition of rape in India emphasizes the absence of 
consent, an important aspect of the actus reus of the offence, as per 
the 84th Law Commission Report19. However, in the case of a 
married woman, consent is nothing more than an over rated 
                                                          
15 V. Barshis, The Question of Marital Rape, 6 WOMEN‟S STUDIES 
INTERNATIONAL FORUM 383, 383-393 (1983). 
16 A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011. 
17  A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625. 
18 See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 21; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10 Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
preamble, arts. 12, 13 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3; THE CONSTITUTION OF 
INDIA, Arts. 14, 15, 16; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, preamble, arts. 3, 7, 13 Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, preamble, arts. 3, 14, 
23, 26 Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, art. 16 .A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 1948. 
19 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 84th Report on Rape and Allied Offences: Some 
Questions of Substantive Law, Procedure and Evidence (1980), available at 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report84.pdf. (last visited 10 
Mar. 2014). 
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illusion. Section 375 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 contains seven 
descriptions regarding consent, wherein consent of a woman below 
eighteen years is irrelevant to constitute the offence of rape.  
Exception 2 to section 375, on the contrary, absolves a man from the 
offence of rape for sexual intercourse with his wife of fifteen years 
of age. Firstly, this grants a license to the husband to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife of fifteen years without her consent. 
Secondly, it forgoes the right of the wife to grant/abstain from 
granting consent after eighteen years of age. Thirdly, when 
compared with section 376 (2) (i) of IPC, which punishes rape of a 
woman under sixteen years of age with rigorous imprisonment of 
minimum ten years to life imprisonment, the exemption under 
section 375 seems to be hypocritical  as it condones the act itself.   
It is submitted that overt violence of any category is not a necessary 
element of rape as defined in section 375. Rather, the cardinal fact is 
the absence of consent on the part of the woman. In order to 
absolve one of criminal liability in a case of rape, the consent 
should be real.20 Explanation 2 to section 375 provides that „consent 
means an unequivocal voluntary agreement‟ which can be vitiated 
by circumstances that take away the freedom of choice. A 
combined reading of section 90 of IPC (deals with consent for the 
purposes of the Code) and seven clauses in section 375 provide 
grounds of vitiation, which includes against will; without consent; 
consent obtained in fear of death or hurt; misrepresentation as 
being her husband; unsoundness of mind; intoxication or 
administration of stupefying substance(s); under eighteen years of 
age; and inability to communicate consent. The Law Commission 
Report (LCR), 1980 noted that „consent should be active consent, as 
distinguished from that consent which is said to be implied by 
silence.'21 Surprisingly, the exemption given to sexual intercourse of 
man with his wife has necessarily eliminated the requirement of 
any voluntary consent. Thus, a woman may be under duress or 
coercion or intoxication, and yet, her husband can rape her without 
her free and voluntary consent.  
                                                          
20 Id. at 7. See also LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 42nd Report on Indian Penal 
Code (1971), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-
50/Report42.pdf (last visited 10 Mar. 2014). 
21 Supra note 17 at 8. 
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The author submits that section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act 
deals with presumption of absence of consent in certain rape cases 
provided under section 376 (2) of IPC, where if the sexual 
intercourse is proved and the woman denies consent, then the court 
„shall‟ presume absence of consent. Thus, a mandatory 
presumption is placed on the court if for instance, among other 
cases, the woman is under sixteen years of age, or the offender is a 
person in a position of trust or authority over the woman. This 
presumption does not apply when a woman of fifteen years or over 
is raped by her husband who holds a position of trust, as it stands 
exempted under exception 2 to section 375. It is, therefore, pertinent 
to address this patriarchal injustice and the resulting ambiguities in 
the Amendment Act of 2013.  
The Ambiguities and Discrimination in the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 2013 
The 2007 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women removes the exception of marital 
rape from the definition of rape.22 Despite such recommendations, 
and the continued demands from women groups, the retained 
marital exception exhibits many discrepancies in the Amendment 
Act of 2013 and evidences an unnecessary policy of 
discrimination.23  
The LCR 197124  introduced the concept of marital rape on the basis 
of absence of consent when husband and wife are living apart 
under a decree of judicial separation or by mutual consent, to a 
                                                          
22 See also, Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women, 1967 
art. 14 A/RES/48/104; Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, arts. 11(1), 22, 24, 29 G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46. 
23 See, Ashwin Abhinav, A Comparative Analysis in Socio-legal Perspectives, 
29 (1 &2) IND. SOCIO-LEGAL J. 73 (2009); Batra Majula, Marital Rape: Is There 
a Remedy?, 10(1) M.D.U. L. J. 205 (2005; Suchil Kumar Satpathy, Marital 
Rape, 104 CR.L.J 182 (1998); Subhash Chandra Singh, Marital Rape: A 
feminist View, 3 S. C. J. 45 (2002). 
24 Supra note 20. 
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limited extent.25 Following the amendment to Child Marriage 
Restraint Act, 1929 (CMR Act), the LCR 198026 provided an 
amendment to the marital rape exemption by increasing the age of 
the wife to eighteen years as it believed that since marriage with a 
girl below 18 years is prohibited (though it is not void as a matter 
of personal laws), sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years 
should also be prohibited. Subsequently, this was reiterated in LCR 
200027 and also in the 2006 Draft Bill presented by the National 
Commission for Women which sought to criminalize marital rape. 
In the 2007 Report, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has recommended the 
removal of the marital rape exception.28 
Subsequent to the Delhi gang rape incident, the JVC was 
constituted. It suggested the criminalization of marital rape, 
reasoning that „[c]onsent will not be presumed in the event of an 
existing marital relationship between the complainant and the 
accused.‟29 The Bill that was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 
December 4, 2012 had retained the exception, which subsequently 
failed to incorporate the recommendations of the JVC Report 2013, 
which was eventually received on April 2, 2013. On the non 
inclusion of marital rape, Union Home Secretary R.K. Singh 
clarified that accusations of rape might cause irreparable damage to 
the institution of marriage.30 A wife cannot be made a victim of 
                                                          
25 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 42nd Report on Indian Penal Code (1971), 
available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report42.pdf (last 
visited 10 Mar. 2014) at 277-279 (Explanation II to proposed section 375). 
26 Supra note 19.  
27 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, 172nd Report on Review of Rape Laws (2000), 
available at http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/rapelaws.htm. (last 
visited 10 Mar. 2014). 
28 See also, Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women, art. 14 
A/RES/48/104; Articles 11(1), 22, 24 & 29, Convention on Elimination of 
all forms of Discrimination against Women, arts. 11(1), 22, 24, 29 G.A. Res. 
34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, UN Doc. A/34/46. 
29 Supra note 7. 
30 Bharti Jain & Rakhi Chakrabarty, Govt justifies exclusion of marital rape as 
sexual offence in amended ordinance, TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 19, 2013, available at 
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rape and torture in order to protect the institution of marriage. 
Further, it is amusing that marital rape is partially recognized 
when the spouses are living separately,31 but not otherwise. 
Difference between Age of Consent and Age of Exception 
It is submitted that since 1860, the various amendments to the IPC 
have ensured that the age of consent and the age of exception 
continue to be the same. The original IPC in 1860 placed age of 
consent as 10 years under the fifth clause of section 375 and age of 
exception as 10 years. Both were amended to 12 years by the 
Amendment Act 10 of 1891 as a result of the judicial decision in 
Queen Empress v. Hurree Mohan Mythee,32 in which the accused 
caused death of his child wife, aged about 11 years and 3 months, 
by having sexual intercourse with her. The passing of the CMR Act 
raised the marriageable age to 14 years which had an impact on the 
IPC as well. The CMR Act was amended in 1978, laying down the 
minimum age of marriage to be 18 years in the case of females.  
The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 
prohibits sexual exploitation or sexual activity with any child 
below the age of 18 years.33 Similarly, marriage of a woman below 
18 years and a man below 21 years is a cognizable offence under 
the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. Accordingly, the JVC 
Report suggested the removal of the marital rape exception and 
raising the age of consent to eighteen years.34 It is submitted that 
the Amendment Act of 2013 provided the age of consent at 
eighteen years and the age of exception was retained as fifteen 
years. However, the rationale behind this differentiation has not 
been provided by the Parliament. 
                                                                                                                                    
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-02-
19/india/37179234_1_sexual-offence-live-in-partner-home-secretary. 
31 PEN. CODE § 376 B. 
32Queen Empress, (1890) I.L.R Cal. 49. 
33 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, § 2(d). 
34 Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, § 15. 
Christ University Law Journal                                                   ISSN 2278-4322 
106 
 
Child Marriage and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 
The Law Commission of India noted in its Report No. 205: 
“Child marriage stunts the growth and development, particularly of the 
girl child who is the more vulnerable partner…. child marriage is a 
violation of human rights, compromising the development of girls and 
often resulting in early pregnancy and social isolation, with little 
education and poor vocational training reinforcing the gendered nature of 
poverty.”35 
Child marriage has negatively impacted the rights of the child 
protected under the Convention on Rights of the Child, 1989. This 
includes the right to express their views freely, the right to 
protection from all forms of abuse, and the right to be protected 
from harmful traditional practices etc.36 The Prohibition of Child 
Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) replaced the Child Marriage Restraint 
Act, 1929. The PCMA has made the offences cognizable and 
bailable,37 and has also enhanced the punishment for male adults 
marrying a child and for persons performing, abetting, promoting 
or attending a child marriage.38 
While these legal measures aim at reducing the instance of child 
marriage in India, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, on 
the contrary, continues to accept this crime. The exception to 
Section 375 IPC, which permits a husband to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife not being under the age of 15 years, is in 
direct contravention of the laws restraining marriage in which 
either of the party is a child, that is, a female below the age of 18 
                                                          
35 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, Proposal To Amend The Prohibition of Child 
Marriage Act, 2006 And Other Allied Laws, Report No. 205 (2008), available at 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report205.pdf. 
36 UNICEF, EARLY MARRIAGE, A HARMFUL TRADITIONAL PRACTICE: A 
STATISTICAL EXPLORATION (2005), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Early_Marriage_12.lo.pdf; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
37 Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, § 15. 
38 India: Third and Fourth Combined Periodic Report on the CRC draft, 
Inputs of West Bengal State, 9-10 (2007) available at 
http://wcd.nic.in/crc3n4/crc3n4_1r.pdf. 
Shivika Choudhary                                              Marital Rape: An Evaluation 
107 
 
years and a male below the age of 21 years.39 This was even 
observed by the Delhi High Court40 in a recent judgment; “this 
provision in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is a specific illustration of 
legislative endorsement and sanction to child marriages.” 
The unnecessary ambiguity created by the alleged exception is a 
major lacuna in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.41 The 
National Family Health Survey of 2005-2006 (NFHS-3) carried out 
in twenty-nine states confirmed that 45% of women currently aged 
20-24 years were married before the age of eighteen years.42 
Therefore, it is pertinent to address the grave ambiguity created by 
the marital rape exception to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 
2013. 
Marital Rape as a Crime 
Apart from the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939 most 
personal laws recognize rape as a ground for divorce or judicial 
separation.43 Cruelty is also recognised as a ground for divorce by 
all personal laws. Rape can be brought within the ambit of the term 
cruelty for expanding its interpretation.44 Please refer to Table 1 
                                                          
39 Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, § 2 (a). 
40 Court on its Own Motion (Lajja Devi) v. State 2013 Cri.L.J. 3458. 
41 See, VASUDHA DHAGAMWAR, LAW, POWER AND JUSTICE: THE PROTECTION 
OF PERSONAL RIGHTS IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 113 (2nd ed. 2010); JULIA 
ALLISON & LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 85-
6 (1993). 
42 National Family Health Survey of 2005-2006 (NFHS-3), available at 
http://www.nfhsindia.org/ (The NFHS-3 facts and figures mentioned 
hereafter have all been retrieved from this website) (last visited Dec. 1, 
2013). 
43 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 13 (2) (ii) (Amendment 1976); Indian 
Divorce Act, 1869, § 10; Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, § 32 (d) 
(Amendment 1988); Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27 (1-A) (i). 
44 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 13 (1) (ia) (Amendment 1976); Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriage act, 1939 § 2 (viii); Indian Divorce Act, 1869, § 10; 
Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, § 32 (dd) (Amendment 1988); 
Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27 (1) (d). 
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which enlists the treatment of rape as a ground for divorce or 









Personal laws provide the civil remedy of divorce and refrain from 
punishing the offender. Even the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 
entitles a woman to seek judicial separation, but doesn‟t grant her a 
right to have her partner prosecuted. While the law is indeed a step 
towards recognizing the sexual abuse by partners, it still falls short 
of punishing the perpetrator.  
In contrast, while the IPC punishes rape by a husband during 
judicial separation and personal laws recognize it as a ground for 
divorce, a husband is still permitted to seek restitution of conjugal 
rights.45 This too does not take into account the fact of women‟s 
consent. Such compulsion on a woman to return to the company of 
her husband whom she has deserted out of her own free will, is but 
a further aperture in the legal system ultimately legalizing marital 
rape. 
                                                          
45 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 9 (Amendment 1976); Indian Divorce Act, 
1869, § 32; Special Marriage Act, 1954, § 27 (1) (d). 
Table 1: Rape and Cruelty as Grounds for Divorce  
under the Personal Laws 
Act  Cruelty Provisions 
(Section) 
Rape Provisions  
(Section)   
Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 (Amendment 1976) 
13 (1)(ia)  13 (2)(ii)  
Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriage Act, 1939  
2 (viii)  -  
Indian Divorce Act, 1869  10  10  
Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1936 
(Amendment 1988)  
32 (dd)  32 (d)  
Special Marriage Act, 
1954  
27 (1) (d)  27(1-A)(i)  
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Incongruity in Punishment for Marital and Non Marital 
Rape 
A significant difference, in the nature and term of punishment, 
exists between those committing rape on their wives and those 
committing rape on other women. This is reflective of the 
patriarchal attitude of the legislature. In the case of rape of a wife 
aged fifteen years or above by the husband, the perpetrator is 
absolved of any punishment.46 It is even more alarming that the 
maximum punishment sanctioned against a man involved in sexual 
intercourse with his wife below the age of fifteen years is less,47 
even though rape of a woman under sixteen years of age is severely 
punished with rigorous punishment of ten years which may extend 
to life imprisonment.48  











                                                          
46 PEN. CODE § 37. 
47 PEN. CODE § 376(1) (It is punishable with minimum imprisonment of 
two years extending to seven years). 
48 PEN. CODE § 376 (2) (i). 
Table 2: Difference in Punishment for Rape 
Nature of Crime   Provision 
(Section) 
Nature of Punishment  




Not Punishable  
Rape of any Woman 
(Read wife below 15 years) 
376  7 Years extendable to  
life imprisonment with 
fine  
Rape by a person holding a 
fiduciary position towards the 
victim by inducing or 
seducing. 
376C  5-10 years or 
 more  
Rape by a relative, guardian or 
teacher or a person holding 
position of authority  
376(2)(f)  10 years rigorous 
imprisonment 
extendable to life 
imprisonment 
 and fine  
Rape during separation by 
decree or otherwise  
376 B  2-7 years  
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It is another ambiguity that such sexual intercourse by husband 
with his wife living separately, by decree or otherwise, is punished 
with imprisonment for a term of two to seven years and fine.49 
While criminality is recognized when the spouses are living 
separately, it is unreasonable that such assault is not recognized as 
a crime when they are living together. Conversely, such acts should 
be recognized as more serious offences because it damages and 
questions the fiduciary relationship based on trust between the 
spouses. 
The IPC has been considerate in recognizing the fact that people 
holding positions of trust with the victim should be made severely 
liable in cases of rape, with a punishment of for a term of ten years 
which may extend to life imprisonment.50 This, however, intensifies 
the debate as to whether a husband would qualify as holding a 
position of trust towards his wife.51 
Further, in section 376C, the IPC penalizes the perpetrator of the 
crime with a punishment of more than 5 years, if he happens to be 
in a fiduciary relationship with the victim, even though the victim 
might have been instigated or seduced into giving consent. One 
party acts as a fiduciary to another when a party acts "for the 
benefit of another person, as to whom he stands in a relation 
implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one 
part and a high degree of good faith on the other part."52  The 
Supreme Court laid down the requirements for determining 
fiduciary relationship between husband and wife and their 
children in the case of Marcel Martins v. M. Printer53 stating that the 
Court shall have to take into consideration the factual context in 
which the question arises for it is only in the factual backdrop that 
the existence or otherwise of a fiduciary relationship can be 
deduced in a given case. It is submitted that in a marriage, the 
                                                          
49 PEN. CODE § 376 B. 
50 PEN. CODE § 376 (2) (f). 
51  Supra notes 1 and 9. 
52  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed., 1979). 
53 (2012) 5 S.C.C. 342; See generally, VASUDHA DHAGAMWAR, LAW, POWER 
AND JUSTICE: PROTECTION OF PERSONAL RIGHTS IN THE INDIA PENAL CODE 
(2nd ed. 2009). 
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spouses depend on each other for material and physical comforts, 
companionship, and love - thereby creating a fiduciary 
relationship. The fiduciary nature of this relationship is evidenced 
in section 122 of IEA, which deems communication during 
marriage as prolonged and is prevented from being disclosed in 
any court, except when one married partner is being persecuted for 
an offence against the other. Consequently, any evidence is 
inadmissible unless it is a prosecution for battery, or some related 
physical or mental abuse considered as cruelty.   
The author would further like to highlight that under section 114A 
of the IEA, there is a presumption of no consent in rape cases, while 
in marital rape there is a presumption of consent by virtue of the 
exception. It is, therefore, submitted that the interplay of the IEA 
and section 375, IPC makes it a nearly impossible task to prosecute 
marital rape. Rather, such a violence should be construed as more 
serious offence owing to the constructive reading of Section 376C 
and Section 376 (2) (f) of the IPC. The above analysis reveals that 
the recent amendment has not addressed the issue of marital rape, 
rather it has granted leverage to the husband to have intercourse 
with his wife without her consent or against her will, which in turn 
will not amount to the offence of rape. 
Conclusion 
 “When a woman is ravished what is inflicted is not merely 
physical injury, but „the deep sense of some deathless 
shame‟…Judicial response to human rights cannot be blunted by 
legal bigotry.” 
- Krishna Iyer, J. in Rafique v. State of UP.54 
The UNICEF Global Report Card on Adolescents, 201255 revealed 
that sexual harassment and assault are endemic and more than half 
                                                          
54 1981 S.C.R. (1) 402. 
55 Kounteya Sinha, 57% of boys, 53% of girls think wife beating is justified, 
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of the young males think that beating their wives is justified. 
Ideally, the exception to section 375 of the IPC should be removed 
by the Parliament. However, owing to the presence of a diverse 
system of personal laws, any radical overhaul of the structure of 
sexual offences is not advisable.56 In the absence of any legislative 
action, it is desirable that the judiciary builds upon the existing 
legal structure by (i) interpreting marital rape as a crime under 
section 376C or section 376 (2) (f) of the IPC,57 and (ii) striking 
down the exception by declaring it ultra vires the Constitution.58 
Respecting the words of Justice Krishna Iyer and having regard to 
the exposition of the law in Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India59 
that the Constitution embraces substantive equality, it is desirable 
that a married woman is treated at par with other women by 
defying the myth of irrevocable consent to marital rape. 
                                                          
56 D. NICOLSAN & L. BIBBINGS, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 185 (1st ed. 2000).  
57 Supra notes 50-53. 
58 Supra notes 16-21. 
59 (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1. 
